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The Evolution of Management from a Trust to Arm’s Length Model of 
exchange in Family Run Businesses: The Case of the Diamond Industry 
 
Abstract.  
Purpose – The primary purpose is to fill the research gap regarding the evolution of managerial 
processes within [largely family] diamond industry firms, especially over the last seven decades. 
Design/methodology/approach – Qualitative data was gathered from interviews with 100 
managers in the diamond industry in Israel, together with data from Israeli government, industry 
and academic sources. 
Findings – Over the recent life cycle of the diamond industry, with its changing structures and 
dynamics, participant firms have evolved through seven stages of engagement, from one based on 
trust and personal connections to more impersonal, standardized connections that exist today.  
Research limitations/implications – In seeking to tell the story of industry participants as a group, 
we have not explored differences in behaviours between the family firms and the non-family firms. 
This should be the work of future research which, if aimed at teasing out the results of this study 
may help shed additional light on the strategic processes that occur within family firms. 
Practical implications – Although the firms examined in this study were from one industry (and an 
arguably narrow cultural base), their development over time was not dissimilar to the experience 
reported in other industries and cultures. This suggests that components of the evolution of the 
strategic process that ensues within family firms may be generalizable throughout cultures. In the 
absence of kin relationships, the importance of trust in their dealings cannot be overstated.  
Originality/value – Our findings demonstrate how one group of participants in the global diamond 
industry has responded to the changing economic, social and political contexts of their operations, 
where trust and personal connections have been replace by more impersonal, standardized dealings. 
Keywords: History, Diamonds, Industry Evolution, Family owned firms, Social networking, Trust, 
Management 
Paper type: Research paper  
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The Evolution of Management from a Trust to Arm’s Length Model of 
exchange in Family Run Businesses: The Case of the Diamond Industry 
 
Introduction 
Family managed firms play a significant role in economies around the world especially in 
terms of GDP growth and employment (Carraher, 2005; Carraher and Carraher, 2006). Indeed, 
some of the large, multidivisional businesses such as Michelin, Armani, Wal-Mart, Home Depot, 
and IKEA were founded and are still controlled and managed by families (Miller and Le Breton 
Miller, 2005). One industry in which family firms have been prominent for centuries is the 
sourcing, manufacture and sale of diamonds (Berger and Herstein, 2015). Inter-industry rivalry was 
restricted, and a co-operative approach was in place, leading to a fragile differentiation of firms 
(Berger and Herstein, 2012; Mostovicz et al., 2007).  
Until recently, the supply side of the diamond industry, worth more than $US72 billion in 
retail sales globally in 2012 (Bain & Co and AWDC, 2013), was dominated and controlled by a 
single firm - De Beers. The control was structured around a cartel structure with a tight control on the 
supply side of rough diamonds (unpolished diamonds). A gradual process of market withdrawal lead 
to DeBeers marketing arm, the Central Selling Organization (CSO), to give up its custodianship of the 
industry and letting market forces lead it. On the demand side many family firms in the diamond 
industry have gone out of business, merged, or became non – family firms run by career managers. 
The mentioned industry evolution forced a managerial evolution in the demand side discussed in this 
paper.  
Strategic management has sought from its early stages to answer the important question of 
how firms attain sustainable competitive advantage. In this expedition, strategic management has 
established theories and concepts that scrutinize the environment and look inside the firm, develop 
ideas and methodological advances that follow and try to predict management practice. Managers 
need models that help them understand the organizational and environmental antecedents and 
outcomes. Managers should be able to identify how these factors interact to promote change and 
competitive advantage. This paper uses these concepts to explain the managerial evolution of the 
diamond industry in line with environmental change.  
Organizational capabilities are one of the key constructs in strategic management. Building 
on the resource-based view of the firm and ideas about firm routines and capabilities have become 
one of the predominant ways of thinking about firm heterogeneity and performance. The 
fundamental premise of the resource-based view of the firm is that resources and capabilities must 
be valuable and rare to produce above industry average economic rents or competitive advantage. 
Research to date has acknowledged the complex and changing environments in which family 
businesses operate, but often only to the extent that they influence the evolution of the internal 
structures of those businesses. For example, Trevinyo-Rodríguez (2009) argues that the 
evolutionary process of family firms, especially in terms of their ownership structure, is mainly 
driven by environmental opportunities (e.g. market expansion, extended geographic coverage).  
This has tended to be a fairly generic understanding though, considering the “environment” and its 
impacts as rather uni-dimensional. While it is known that cartels form in order to limit competition 
and increase profits (Berger and Herstein, 2014; Bernstein 1992), research into the effects of external 
environmental forces on the evolution and managerial models has been limited (Gupta et al., 2010). 
The aim of this paper is to fill the research gap in both these areas by way of an examination of the 
managerial evolution of the diamond industry, with a focus on how firms within the industry have 
adapted to changing environments, especially in the post-World War 2 period. 
 Diamonds were initially mined in India roughly 2,800 years ago. The first accounts of 
diamonds are biblical, comprising references in Exodus 28:18 and 39:11; Ezekiel 3:9 and 28:13; 
Jeremiah 17:1; and Zachariah 7:12. In Exodus, the diamond (Jahalom) is mentioned twice as being 
one of the twelve valuable jewels etched on the breastplate of the High Priest. These biblical 
references to diamonds are of importance, for they show that even during very early times, the 
diamond was considered to be a valuable stone. The diamond’s scarcity as a gem and its hardness are 
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the dominant features that resonate throughout the history of diamonds (Ghaswala, 1987). Historically, 
the diamond industry was based on social ties because, given its spread globally, there was little 
possibility of enforcing contractual arrangements (Berger and Herstein, 2012). Thus, it became a tribal 
business based on family ties, with contracts enforced through trust and cultural coercion (Spar, 1994). 
This system made selling polished diamonds for Jewish merchants’ relatively easy, reducing 
enforcement and product assessment costs as a result of the community spread out over many 
countries (Grief, 1994). Most exchanges were undertaken through intermediaries who helped certify 
the exchange partners. With the expansion of trade routes and limitations of distribution through 
tribally structured distribution networks, a centralized complex bringing traders together was created. 
It was an accepted enterprise for the Jews scattered throughout Europe to deal in diamonds, because 
they were moneylenders and had strong international networks (Harel, 1986). Since the fourteenth 
century, it was one of the few occupations permitted to the Jews in Europe. As a result, they had to 
acquire in-depth knowledge about how to assess, repair and sell the jewellery that they received as 
collateral for loans. The cutting and polishing of diamonds was one of the few crafts that the medieval 
guilds in Europe allowed the Jews to pursue as a profession (Schnitzer, 1988; Szenberg, 1973). If Jews 
sought a profession, it had to be either gem polishing or money lending. In either instance, they would 
be dealing with diamonds (Berger and Herstein, 2015). 
Jews had been attracted to the diamond trade as early as the Middle Ages; diamonds are the 
most concentrated and easily transportable form of wealth (Freedman, 1980; Saldern, 1990). Hence, 
for Jews who lived in constant fear of expulsion from their homes, diamonds became a rational means 
of storing and preserving their wealth. The competitive nature of cutting and polishing diamonds, and 
their low transport costs, resulted in diamonds being polished where skills and/or technology were 
highest or where labour costs were lowest. These circumstances led to diamond centres – Antwerp, Tel 
Aviv, Bombay and New York, the four largest cutting and polishing centres in countries in which not a 
single diamond was mined. The local diamond exchanges provided the framework within which 
diamond prices were determined on the demand side based on market forces. An important point to 
make is the fact that the supply side of the diamond industry was tightly controlled by a cartel like 
structure, while the demand side was driven by free competition based on private family firms. The 
following figure represents the diamond value chain from the ground to the jewel: 
 
--- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
--- 
 
The Supply Side: De Beers 
 In 1725 diamonds were discovered in Brazil, and for 130 years Brazil remained the world’s 
chief supplier. In 1876 the South African diamond fields were developed, leading to the formation of 
De Beers, the CSO and its affiliates. By 1876 Rhodes had gained control of most of the land around 
Kimberly and merged his interests with those of two other syndicates, leading to the formation of the 
De Beers Mining Company in 1880 (Pallister et al., 1988). De Beers has policed the global diamond 
industry for over 100 years, using its powerful diamond marketing arm, the Central Selling 
Organization (CSO). The CSO established a set of rules that ensured low-cost, efficient industry trade 
in diamonds – and, more important, it enforced these rules, via a system of extra-legal sanctions 
(Bernstein, 1992). The De Beers family of companies, which presided over the production and trade 
in unpolished (rough) diamonds, was the most successful and long-lasting cartel in the world (Spar, 
1994). The cartel has managed to convince consumers that diamonds are both valuable and scarce, 
and that they should be purchased based on quality rather than price (Hart, 2001). It was argued that 
only a strong core like the De Beers Group, could maintain such a hold over a complex and global 
industry for such a long time. On the other hand, similar cartels have not appeared in the gold, 
uranium, silver or oil markets, which have similar structures but no cooperation (Spar, 1994). At its 
peak (1996), sales through the CSO were almost US$5 billion, accounting for more than 75% of the 
world’s rough diamond production by value. Since then, the market has evolved from an intricate web-
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like structure to a market open to free competition.  De Beers has of late sought to adjust its role in the 
industry from being the overseer of the industry to acting purely as a major player in it (Gupta et al., 
2010). In 2000, external events such as the decision by producers in Russia, Canada and Australia 
to allocate diamonds outside the De Beers channel forced De Beers to modify its model (Campbell 
et al., 2005; Kretschmer, 2003). Furthermore, in the wake of the increasing awareness of blood 
diamonds, De Beers sought to avoid the risk of bad publicity by limiting sales of its own mined 
products. De Beers’ market share fell from as high as 90% in the 1980s to less than 40% in 2012. 
These changes on the supply side resulted in a more fragmented diamond market with more 
transparency and greater liquidity and price fluctuations. In November 2011 the Oppenheimer 
family announced their intention to sell the entirety of their 40% stake in De Beers to Anglo 
American, thereby increasing Anglo American’s ownership of the company to 85% (AFP, 2011). 
The transaction was worth £3.2 billion ($5.1bn) in cash and ended the Oppenheimer dynasty's 
eighty-year ownership of De Beers (Bloomberg, 2011).   
 
The Demand Side 
 The De Beers’ network of marketing firms in 1893 was made up of 10 firms only (Roberts, 
1987). All of the firms were interconnected by marriage and family links, and all were controlled by 
Jewish merchants (Pallister et al., 1988). The demand for rough, gem quality diamonds represents a 
derived demand (Saldern, 1990). A rough diamond is required only for the sake of its final product. 
Polished diamonds are traditionally purchased for three main reasons: (1) adornment and conspicuous 
consumption, (2) a means of storing value, and (3) as keepsakes. Generally, several of these 
motivational factors are present when diamonds are purchased and manifest themselves in products 
such as wedding related jewellery, luxury jewellery, jewellery for other occasions, and loose 
diamonds. It is important to note that around one-third of all retail diamond sales consist of wedding 
related jewellery (Paribas Capital Markets, 1996; Saldern, 1990). As a result, demand is strongly 
influenced by the number of marriages around the world. The purchase of luxury jewellery depends 
primarily on the amount of disposable income available to the customer. The demand for jewellery is 
affected by the price of related goods, because diamonds compete against or complement other luxury 
goods such as gems and fashionable clothes. The consumption of other diamond jewellery, for 
instance, non-wedding and non-luxury diamonds, consists mainly of casual jewellery worn by women 
and increasingly by men on a daily basis. The purchase of diamonds as an investment was popular in 
the late 1970s, when good quality diamonds reached extraordinarily high price levels (Economist, 
1992). During the global recession of the early 1980s, this demand dwindled. Cut and polished 
diamonds rarely provide a satisfactory rate of return for an investor (Saldern, 1990). In times of 
uncertainty, however, diamonds still remain an important medium for capital flight, as they retain their 
value across international boundaries and are easily transportable and their value is relatively constant 
over borders (Shainberg, 1987). Currently, investment demand can be described as marginal and is not 
generally viable.    
Our approach is a combination of historical review of the global diamond industry, to provide 
a context within which the more recent industry changes can be explored, followed by explication of 
the changes we derived from qualitative data gathered via interviews with industry participants and 
experts to better understand its managerial evolution. This article describes further the way in which 
environmental forces affect network structures and how managerial models evolve in relation to 
them. In particular, the aim of this paper is to understand and explain the dynamics of network 
behaviour and managerial evolution resulting, in part, from external forces. We begin with a review 
of the existing literature leading to the questions we posit as a result. A discussion of the methodology 
we utilized is followed by the presentation of the results of the historical review and consideration of 
the changes in the operating environments for the (largely) family businesses that have taken place 
over the last 70 years, and to explore the impacts these different environments might have on the 
businesses and their development. From this analysis, we discern the movement of the industry 
through seven distinct managerial evolutionary stages, and so illustrate the managerial model in each 
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stage and the market forces shaping it. The paper concludes with a discussion of the lessons learned 
from the process and avenues for future research. 
 
Theoretical Development 
In essence, the primary philosophy underpinning modern management can be characterized as 
the Material-Instrumental model. The model claims that firms are purely material objects and those 
in them are purely instruments (Dent and Bozeman, 2014). As Bedeian (1998, p. 9) has noted, “an 
appreciation for the management discipline’s origins is also invaluable for understanding the 
implicit values and orientations of modern practitioners, as well as the inherited epistemological 
foundations, theoretical paradigms, and methodological strategies of today’s scholars”. Trevinyo-
Rodríguez (2009) examined the evolution of internal structures of family businesses (ownership 
structure transitional configurations p. 296), as they manage the family, business and environmental 
networks in which they are embedded and respond to the key challenges of growth, adaptation of 
ownership structures and family conflict. She utilizes the insights of Gubitta and Gianecchini 
(2002) and Litz (1995) to characterize a family business as a firm in which two or more key players 
related by kinship, adjacent affinity or solid alliances hold a sufficiently large portion of financial 
capital (full ownership) or board control (controlling ownership/governance) to empower them to 
make decisions concerning strategic management and overall business goals, and where the family 
members aim to perpetuate the degree of family involvement, implying therefore, a trans-
generational pursuance intention (Trevinyo-Rodríguez, 2009:285). 
Organisational change management theory for small and medium-sized family managed firms 
is an under-researched field (By and Dale, 2008). Changing political, economic, social and 
technological factors can leave such unprepared firms exposed to external as well as internal 
pressures (Berger and Herstein, 2015). The successful management of change is crucial for these 
firms’ survival and success. Change is an ever-present feature of firms’ life affecting all 
organisations in all industries. Changes in the external environment can have a major influence on 
the ability of these firms’ to compete effectively. When new players enter the market, the long-
standing competitiveness of SMEs that are unprepared for change can be undermined. We believe 
that change management needs to be at the heart of the strategic management process. Managers 
need to understand the strategic framework within which the firm is operating. This includes a full 
understanding of the firm’s existing strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. Furthermore, 
the process includes identifying the change agent be it internal of external to the industry. 
 This definition provides a vibrant statement about the classes of firms in which we are 
interested in this study. Using a comparable definition, Kreiser, et al (2006) pursued to better 
understand the strategic method that occurs within family firms, by way of an intergenerational and 
intercultural case study analysis of the historical development of the growth strategies of four 
family firms in the USA, Finland, and Sweden. We too will be utilising a case study approach, albeit 
with one industry and one country. Two further important points Kreiser’s, et al’s (2006) findings 
highlight are, firstly, that throughout their evolution, the strategies enacted by the family companies 
appear to have been formulated with two issues in mind – financial security and control of the firm 
within the family unit – and, second, the different ways in which competitive market pressures 
influence the companies’ strategic postures, depending on the stage in the company life cycle. 
The aptitude of a firm to modify its strategy in line with evolving and changing internal 
capabilities and environmental conditions is a crucial outcome (Brunninge et al., 2007). The  
unification of ownership, the focus of ownership, and management lead to managers being exposed 
to fewer pressures from outside stakeholders who demand transparency, accountability, and 
strategic renewal. Ownership concentration among the top management of the firm can lead to risk 
aversion and lack of preparedness to engage in strategic change doings such as corporate 
diversification, product innovation or entering new international markets. Strategic change typically 
involves taking risk. The concentrated nature of ownership places closely owned firms at a 
disadvantage in terms of risk bearing and promotes strategic inertia. Moreover, in closely held 
firms, owner-managers typically develop the strategy at the founding of a firm. Due to their 
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personal involvement, this commitment to the strategy often continues over time leading to 
unwillingness to change the original strategy. 
McNaughton’s and Green’s (2006) analysis of the relationship between corporate ownership 
and market structure utilized resource dependence and transaction cost analysis in organizational 
theories. These theories explicitly focus on the structure of the relations that define a market and 
attribute variability in firm performance to the ability of corporations to adapt to those relations 
(Burt, 1988: 357). The resource dependence literature characterizes industry structures as dense but 
ever-changing networks of interdependent companies, each competing for positional advantage in 
relation to their environment and each other, by gaining control over resources (Glasberg and 
Schwartz, 1983). Transaction cost analysis theory predicts that firms seek to gain control over 
resources where there is environmental uncertainty, high risk of opportunistic behaviour and high 
costs of monitoring and enforcement (Williamson, 1975). In terms of the behaviour of the firms 
themselves, this includes mergers that internalize resources, and diversification and conglomerate 
strategies to decrease dependence on a particular set of resources. Both theories argue that 
businesses are restricted in their autonomy by structural dependence on the inputs and outputs of 
other businesses, or to put it another way, by their place in the value chain (Walters, 2012). While 
not explicitly focusing on networks, Porter (1980) suggests that external forces can influence 
relationships within exchange systems. To the extent that a key element of this analysis is the 
impact of changing environmental contexts on organizations, it is also entirely appropriate to make 
reference to the systems thinking of the environment school of strategic management, and the work, 
for example, of Ansoff (1957; 1965) and Emery and Trist (1965).  
 Throughout history, external forces have affected the infrastructure of the diamond industry 
and changed its strategic direction and market structure. One must be familiar with the industry’s 
origins and the effect of external forces on its workings if it is to be better understood and researched. 
Given that industry structures evolve constantly and alter their managerial models in light of internal 
and external changes, so a more comprehensive, longitudinal investigation of the industry is warranted. 
In examining the Israeli diamond industry as a case study, the contribution of this paper is to 
consider the changes in the value chain that have taken place over the last 70 years as different 
operating environments for the (largely) family businesses, and to explore the impacts these 
different environments might have on the managerial models. An important additional element in the 
mix is the evolution of the diamond industry from a trust based or socially based industry to a more 
impersonal, standardized industry. 
 
Methodology 
 The research focused on the firm and its management as the primary context in which to 
explore the relationship between the choice of the strategy and environmental change. We claim that 
in small firms the study of change should be focused on the owner–manager, who is at the core of 
the change processes. Interestingly, change management was argued to be equivalent to crisis 
management in many situations, and it was also reported that changes more often than not came 
about as a reaction to a situation rather than being proactive initiatives.  
 Information pertaining to this research was gathered through extensive research amongst 
diamond companies, access to who is notoriously difficult. Face–to–face interviews with 100 
managers in the Israeli diamond industry were conducted building up step by step a behavioural 
picture of the diamond industry, its operations and networks as it unfolds over time. Since one of the 
world’s main centres for the diamond trade is based in Israel, and it being one of Israel’s key export 
industries, the study focused on polished diamond exporters located in the Israeli Diamond Exchange. 
The population of Israeli polished diamond exporters comprised of around 900 polished diamond 
exporting firms, of whom 190 firms were defined as official Israeli diamond exporters. The Israeli 
Ministry of Industry and Trade – Diamond Division defined an official diamond exporter as one 
who officially export $4m and above of polished diamonds a year. A database of polished diamond 
exporters was built after examination of all available sources of information. 
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Following Brand and Slater’s (2003) argument that in business research, qualitative work 
should precede quantitative testing, we used a case study approach to shed light on the structural 
factors that affect business in the Israeli diamond industry (see also Burgelman, 1983; Eisenhardt, 
1989; Robertson, 1993, Welch, 2000; Zhang, 1994). Case study research is useful for focusing on 
understanding the dynamics present within specific settings (Eisenhardt, 1989) i.e. the diamond 
industry. Through interviews with key players, we aimed to elucidate the various forces at work in 
the industry and examine the dynamics between them. The interview stage provided key 
information on the intricacies of the mutual relations that would have been hard to capture in a 
closely structured research instrument or questionnaire. To complement the fieldwork, we collected 
data from journals, books, industry magazines, official government data and interviews with 
government officials. The case study approach to theory building was therefore used to develop our 
holistic view of the evolutionary transformation of the industry (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994). 
During the interviews, we applied an open-ended interview protocol. Open - ended interviews are 
widely accepted as an appropriate technique for gathering data on cultural issues, especially when 
hard data are difficult to come by and the research is exploratory in nature (McCracken, 1988). 
Open-ended questions allow interviewees to elaborate on cultural and managerial issues as well as 
the managerial mechanisms relating to conducting business in the industry. The interviewer 
requested supplementary information when a theme was unclear or incomplete and supplemented 
the prepared questions as needed to obtain more accurate and in-depth responses. The researchers 
emphasized to all respondents that their comments would remain anonymous. All interviews were 
transcribed and due to the secrecy of the industry none of the respondents were willing to be 
recorded or directly linked to a specific quote.  
Extensive interviews were conducted with the respective managers of 100 firms out of the 
190 (53%) official diamond exporters, which represent 56% of the total official Israeli polished 
diamond exports by value. The interviews ranged from 3/4 of an hour up to 4 hours in length 
depending on the level of co-operation the researchers got. Based on industry experts and the Israeli 
Ministry of Industry and Trade, the sample was divided into the four groups by size of their 
polished diamond exports in US dollars. Group one consisted of 8 firms with exports exceeding 
US$50M. We sampled 7 firms covering 88% of Israeli polished diamond exporters in this category. 
Group two consisted of 26 firms who export between US$20-50M of polished diamond exports. 
We sampled 20 firms covering 77% of this category. Group three consisted of 41 firms who 
exported polished diamonds between US$10-20M. We sampled 20 firms making up 49% of this 
category. Group four consisting of 115 firms exporting polished diamonds between US$4-10M. We 
sampled 53 firms constituting 46% of this category.  The researchers operating from offices in the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade proved to be a catalyst to obtain interviews and examine otherwise 
unattainable sources of information. However, achieving the trust needed for access through 
governmental institutions such as the Israeli Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Diamond 
Controllers Office and the Israeli Diamond Institute was a gradual process that took more than a 
year to formulate. The sample limitation was achieved as a result of time allocation and the need to 
interview the various firms building up the industry. Once redundancy in the information attained was 
achieved the interview process was stopped. The sample characteristics as well as the distribution of 
the study sample and the research coverage are presented in tables 1 and 2.  
 
--- 
Insert tables 1 and 2 about here 
--- 
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The Seven Managerial Stages 
Based on the qualitative data we gathered from interviews together with data from Israeli 
government, industry and academic sources we built the managerial evolutionary process of the 
industry and linked it to external events that were in many cases the catalyst for change. We can see 
the rationalization of the industry has forced the managers to evolve from trust or social models of 
exchange to more rational ones structured around arm's length models of exchange. It is important to 
note that as the managerial models changed in the Israeli diamond industry filtered to the rest of the 
industry, leading to global managerial change and the emergence of new managerial standards. In the 
current section, we included and highlighted some key quotations that were taken from the interviews 
in order to bring the readers the atmosphere of the managerial changes that took place in this seven 
stages’ model. Hence, the seven managerial stages model including a unique combination of academic 
sources as well as first sources information. The stages were constructed on external forces that forced 
managerial adaptation. 
 
STAGE ONE: PRE 1940s – Socially based network model of exchange 
 The ingathering of Jews to the land of Israel galvanized the formation and spectacular growth 
of the Israeli diamond Industry. The socially embedded relations and social contacts that have always 
been important features of Jewish daily life (Ganitsky, 1989; Mannheim, 1984; Patt-Shamir, 2006) 
played a key role in this development. From its inception, the Israeli diamond industry was an industry 
devoted entirely to export. Diamond clubs sprouted up in Israel and polishing diamonds provided a 
decent living (Shainberg, 1987). Israeli polished diamond exports were largely targeted at American 
consumers (Economist, 1992; Spar, 1994), to a large extent because of the Jewish connections with 
their communities overseas. Initially, social networks made selling polished diamonds for the Jewish 
diamantaire relatively easy (Shainberg, 1987; Shor, 1993). Before World War II (1939), Jewish 
diamantaires lived in close proximity as a result of the high degree of uncertainty in daily life in 
Palestine (Forem, 1997). The managers we interviewed who were active at the time claimed that in 
those days, if they did not help themselves and each other, no one would (a type of altruistic 
behaviour). Indeed, many managers claimed that their initial success during the 1930s and 1940s was 
attributable to global and highly networked family ties.  
 The development of the Palestinian diamond industry led to the formation of the first 
managerial model discussed in this paper, which was based on the CSO’s marketing and selling 
framework. Foreign polished diamond buyers came to Palestine to purchase polished diamonds. Most 
exchanges were conducted through intermediaries who helped certify the exchange partners and 
extended family members (Gulati, 1995). They showed the foreign diamantaires an assortment of 
polished diamonds in a “box”. The foreign buyers were forced to purchase the entire contents of the 
box or none at all, so they could not select specific diamonds from the box. This lead to a model based 
on the average quality versus the average price of the lot. This was a very similar model undertaken by 
DeBeers when it sold rough diamonds to sight holders. The Palestinian diamantaires presented a 
number of boxes that the foreign buyers could choose from, at varying prices. As opposed to the 
managerial rules of the CSO, negotiation on the price was more readily acceptable. However, if a 
buyer reneged on an oral agreement or negotiated too hard over the price, no one would ever deal with 
him again (he would be cast out of the network). Interviewees claimed that one specific polished 
diamond might have made the entire transaction profitable. On the other hand, the foreign buyer may 
have purchased the box simply to build trust for future exchanges. Thus, relationships built on the 
mutual understanding of helping each other out evolved, or reciprocity, over time through ongoing 
exchanges. As one of the interviewees noted: 
 
When you dealt with a broker or customer that you did not know well, it could be a problem. If things 
went wrong, only God knew what could happen. With someone I knew, problems could be solved 
internally and quickly as it’s a cash business... I keep long term and friendly relations with my 
suppliers and customers as that's the only way to become important, and if you are not important, you 
are not shown the stones first or get the best price”. 
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 Given the problems with cash flow, in the Palestinian diamond industry, payments for polished 
diamonds were based on cash before delivery (CBD), cash on inspection (COI), or cash against box 
(CAD) in the country of origin. The increased demand for polished diamonds throughout the world, 
especially based on social business networks, pushed foreign buyers to come to Israel despite the high 
costs of transportation to the country. Having made the investment, these foreign buyers were under a 
great deal of pressure to actually purchase diamonds. Furthermore, there were the time constraints of 
the visits. The interviewees claimed that these facts helped close deals quickly. The steady supply of 
rough diamonds at competitive prices provided by the CSO as a result of De Beers' interest in creating 
a strong diamond industry in British-ruled Palestine also helped build the industry. This help came at 
the expense of rough diamonds that normally would have been allocated to other diamond centres. The 
motivation and specialization of the Palestinian diamond industry established by Jews who came from 
Europe to Palestine out of ideological inclinations made it an economically attractive industry at the 
time. 
 
STAGE TWO: 1940s - 1950s – The resource based view of managing diamonds 
 As diamond centres in Europe fell under Nazi control during World War II, the demand for 
polished diamonds from Palestine increased. Given the increased demand and increased stocks, the 
CSO increased rough diamond allocations to Israel at competitive prices (Pollak, 1975). The resource-
based perspective emphasizes firm-specific capabilities and the creation of dynamic capabilities to 
exploit internal and external firm-specific competencies to compete in changing environments. In 
1940 the Palestine Diamond Club was formed (Shor, 1993) to strengthen the industry's capabilities. 
This was the first step in the formalization of a coherent organizational structure that pushed 
Palestinian diamantaires to conform to specific rules, norms and values (Forem, 1997). Space and 
security problems within the Israeli Diamond Exchange necessitated a new and enlarged diamond 
complex. Interviewees claimed that what the industry leaders at the time envisioned was a self-
contained structure that provided providing all of the facilities necessary for the trade in diamonds. 
Diamantaires wanted a diamond exchange with a trading floor and office facilities, complemented by 
offices, governmental agencies, shipping facilities, insurance, legal and accounting services, banks, 
restaurants, travel agencies and gemmological laboratories, all under one roof. These leaders believed 
that polished diamond buyers globally would be lured by the prospect that within a single secure 
environment they could find everything they needed. In addition, industry experts anticipated that as a 
result the exchange would also prompt other international diamond firms and customers to reallocate 
diamonds to Israel. The managerial model of the period was still strongly embedded in family based 
social networks. As the following quotation illustrates, the better the ties, the better the price:  
 
“If two diamantaires brought the exact same polished diamond to me, I might pay up to 5% more to 
the one I feel more comfortable with – it’s more to encourage him to come back and help him out”. 
 
 In addition, another manager noted that during this period of time:  
“ 
As the organizational structure of the Israeli diamond industry matured, some Palestinian 
diamantaires were able to develop relationships with new customers who came to buy in the new 
central complex, as opposed to using intermediaries and going around to geographically dispersed 
firms”. 
 
As a result, this managerial model increased competition because the buyer could shop between 
various diamond firms in a relatively short span of time. Hence, the buyers could move easily, 
compare prices and product range but were still under time and expense constraints.  
  
STAGE THREE: 1950s - 1970s – The knowledge based view of marketing diamonds 
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 Following the end of World War II, Holland and Belgium began to reconstruct their diamond 
industries (Bruton, 1981; Paribas Capital Markets, 1996). With the withdrawal of Britain from 
Palestine in 1947, full-scale war erupted leading to the formation of the state of Israel in 1948, which 
destabilized the diamond industry in Israel. The Israeli diamond industry had to compete once again 
with other diamond centres while trying to keep existing customers. The competition was based on 
managerial knowledge and connections. The knowledge-based view focuses on the acquisition, 
internal development, accumulation, exploitation and diffusion of knowledge-intensive 
organizational capabilities. A new diamond complex, complementing the existing one, was 
constructed in 1969. The mass immigration from Europe after WWII brought much needed 
managerial knowledge, experienced workers, and networked diamantaires to the country strengthening 
the industry's knowledge based advantage over other centres that were in the process of rebuilding 
themselves. As a result of the positive outlook for the diamond industry as a whole and the strong 
position of the Israeli diamond industry, Israeli diamantaires started taking even larger risks than in the 
past. Until the late 1950s managers still relied heavily on family ties to market their polished 
diamonds, an approach that began to limit the growth of the Israeli diamond industry demanding 
managerial rethinking. One of the interviewees noted that:  
 
“As the new generation of managers inherited and set up businesses, introduced new cuts of 
diamonds, and implemented new managerial models, the evolution of the diamond industry continued. 
The structural changes and entrepreneurial nature of the Israeli firms led to the influx of new 
customers and the introduction of new trade”. 
 
 Business networks were enlarged to include customers who were not necessarily Jews or 
related through family. This further eroded socially networked based managerial models and 
transformed them more and more to arms' length models of exchange. This enlargement of the 
marketing network demanded a change in the managerial mindset and in the existing exchange model. 
Stage three evinced increasing flexibility relative to its predecessors. Each “box” had a price per carat 
(US$/C) based on the polished diamonds it contained. The range of polished diamonds was 
homogeneous in quality, colour, cut, clarity and within a certain carat range. The foreign buyers could 
pick and choose those polished diamonds that were best suited to their needs and paid only for those 
polished diamonds that were chosen at the price quoted on the box (US$/C). Then, they could pick and 
choose diamonds from another box that had a different assortment of diamonds on the 4C scale with a 
different price attached (Freedman, 1980). However, despite these changes, at this stage the principle 
managerial models were still fundamentally based on socially embedded ties but in extended networks 
resulting in more frequent problems of exchange enforcement.  
 
STAGE FOUR: 1970s - 1980s – Marketing management in full swing 
 Management strategy came to rely progressively more on statistical analysis of market 
research and market segmentation strategy was consistent with the thinking of customer orientation. 
By the mid-1970s, the discipline of strategic design was in full bloom. Many key notions from 
marketing, such as consumer orientation, positioning, and market segmentation, were accepted and 
endorsed aggressively in the diamond industry. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the marketing 
discipline continued to stress the development of enhanced methodological sophistication and 
analytical rigor.  
 Stage four, the 1970s and 1980s, represented a time of relative growth in the Israeli diamond 
industry and stability in the industry with strong backing from the Israeli government and the banking 
system. However, increased competition from other diamond centres and security problems in Israel 
caused foreign buyers to be wary about coming to Israel (Saldern, 1990). Fierce internal and external 
competition complemented by a decline in the number of customers coming to Israel, demanded that 
the existing managerial model be aligned with the business environment of the time. The 
environmental situation put pressure on the diamantaires in Israel to find customers outside of the 
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Israeli diamond exchange, leading to a need for a more active approach to the marketing of diamonds. 
One of the interviewees described well this stage. He emphasized that: 
 
“in this time, boxes with polished diamonds were sent to highly trusted customers, so they could pick 
and choose as if they were in Israel. The problem with this managerial model was that the buyer was 
under no pressure to buy and could more easily compare prices, and the personal touch was missing”. 
 
 As the interviewees claimed, the diamond buyers could “sleep on their decisions" and were not 
under pressure to purchase polished diamonds. Furthermore, as a result of the enlarged business 
network, fraud was becoming more prevalent, leading to huge losses. The value of the polished 
diamonds in the eyes of the diamantaire changed as a result of the change in the atmosphere in the 
physical location of the transaction. Diamond sellers maintain that the mood, light, smell in the room 
and one’s imagination are all fundamental parts of the value of polished diamonds and precious stones. 
During this period, trust was strained to its limits, and fraudulent behaviour flourished when the "box" 
was in another country and out of the immediate reach of its owner. The strong degree of mutual 
interdependency of the firms within the industry caused a chain reaction in which the bankruptcy of 
one company as a result of fraud led to the failure of other firms, undermining the stability of the 
industry. 
 
STAGE FIVE: 1980s – 1990s – The rationalization of the industry. 
 The global diamond industry, based for generations on socially based models of exchange, 
founded on trust and reputation, received two external shocks in the form of the publication of the 
Rapaport polished diamond price list and the formation of the GIA (Gemmological Institute of 
America), which certified the quality of polished diamonds. The price list standardized a large part of 
the diamond industry in the sense that a diamond on the 4Cs scale now had a price based on a price list 
available to all who wanted it. The list removed some of the mystery surrounding diamonds and 
standardized the industry, creating new opportunities and threats in an environment of increased 
transparency and fewer barriers to trade. In the wake of the price list’s publication, the pricing power 
within the diamond industry diminished. The existence of the price list reduced the need for industry 
specific knowledge, allowing new “external” managers who were interested to engage in the trade to 
enter until recently, a closed industry with high entry barriers. The GIA standardized the industry even 
further by issuing quality certifications based on the 4Cs scale that could later be priced with the 
Rapaport price list, increasing transparency and decreasing needed managerial knowledge. This 
decreased the need for managerial models based on networks that demanded from managers a new 
managerial mindset. 
 The insider/outsider paradox has been taken to its limits, reducing collective cohesion and 
eroding individual participants’ sense of security (Berger and Herstein, 2012). However, since 
1980, the industry has responded defensively to its competitive, economic and legal landscape, 
escalating the negative effects of the paradoxes and compelling itself into a sustained decline in the 
effectiveness of socially based managerial tools (Mostovicz et al., 2007). The 1980s also brought 
increased competition from other global diamond centres such as the new centre in India and the well-
established centre in Belgium (Berger and Herstein, 2015). Pressure from Israeli banks to increase 
collateral and call in loans forced Israeli diamantaires to become more aggressive. As their hefty debts 
and interest payments ballooned, they became increasingly desperate to get rid of polished diamonds 
(Even-Zohar, 1997). The high level of returns from fraudulent behaviour, the desire to survive, and the 
standardization of the industry undermined the confidence that mutual exchange partners would refrain 
from exploiting each other’s vulnerabilities. All of these factors led to the further degradation of 
socially based managerial models and to the start of the rationalization of the industry, based on arm's 
length managerial models common in most other industries. Emblematic of this change was the new 
demand for written as opposed to verbal contracts, which increased transaction costs and helped the 
tax authorities collect the money owed to them. The following quotation from our fieldwork illustrates 
this trend:  
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“No company, no matter how good its relations with its customers and suppliers, was as important as 
the end price of the diamond. Price at the end of the day would close the deal not friendship! ... 
Diamantaires would sell their mothers if there was a profit to be made from it!”. 
 
 Managers needed to become more pro-active than ever before. Therefore, for the first time, 
they actively searched for buyers en masse and created new markets outside of the known diamond 
centres. Given their need to sell quickly at good prices and prevent fraudulent behaviour, they could no 
longer just send the “box”. The situation had reversed, and now it was the sellers, not the buyers, who 
bore the transactional costs of transportation and time constraints, which further eroded prices and 
profitability.  
  
STAGE SIX: 1990s – 2000s – The globalization of management 
 The liberalization of trade restrictions and financial deregulation in Israel and the world during 
the 1990s increased the mobility of capital (Berger and Herstein, 2012). Many of Israel’s diamond 
managers moved large parts of their operations to low cost centres to be competitive globally (Shor, 
1993). As a result of the standardization of the industry, the Israeli government began clamping down 
on tax evasion, and banks were reluctant to give generous credit lines. Managers relied more on 
written contracts and the court system to reduce uncertainty. These impersonal tools reduced the need 
to invest in building social relationships, managerial models that demanded huge financial and time 
investments. Indeed, the distinctive competitive advantage based on social managerial models, for the 
first time, became a liability as it limited who one could exchange with (Berger, 2014). The following 
quotation from our fieldwork illustrates this trend: 
 
“The information that in the past had been a highly valued secret now flowed freely through the 
Internet, transforming the industry to a more transparent industry rendering socially based 
managerial models obsolete. Firms could now post the polished diamonds they had for sale online, at 
prices based on the Rapaport price list and certified by the GIA. Such transactions made the personal 
touch that had once been so important a thing of the past”. 
 
 New, better-educated managers engaged in the pro-active marketing of diamonds through the 
Internet, leveraging this tool for selling in the new competitive landscape. In an effort to draw foreign 
diamond buyers back to Israel, in 1996 the first diamond exhibition in the country was launched under 
the banner of “Israel the Source”. In 1993, the first Israeli magazine devoted to the diamond industry 
called "Yahalom" was inaugurated. Buyers and sellers began advertising their supply and demand 
needs globally using vehicles such as the Internet, magazines, and exhibitions. These industrial 
changes led to the conventional marketing approach common in many other industries that is based on 
standardized, impersonal practices rather than trusted social ties.  
 
 
 
STAGE SEVEN: 2000 – Today – The age of e-diamond management 
Firms presently compete in an intricate and dynamic environment transformed by the flow 
of, and need for, instantaneous information. Knowledge is increasingly becoming the most valuable 
resource for managerial decision making. The influence of technology and globalization 
increasingly the need for firms to acquire information, create knowledge and innovate in order for 
them to competing successfully. The currently forming discontinuities and dominant designs of 
strategic management will in the future stress individual and organizational capabilities to learn and 
innovate. This managerial trend has fully transferred the diamond industry to an arm's length 
industry and the dissolvent of DeBeers as the custodian of the industry. 
The decade began with the elation of the new millennium and ended with a global economic 
crisis that threw the net turnover of the Israeli diamond industry back 10 years, to the same level as 
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1999. As a result, De Beers decided to brand its diamonds, and forward integrate into polished 
diamond trading, in order to compete with other producers such as Australian Argyle and Canadian 
BHP that were not under De Beers’ control (Sheintal, 2010). The diamantaires soon realized that if De 
Beers were offering brand diamonds, they could do the same. Managers adopted the new trend and 
invested more in marketing introducing into the industry dozens of brands, special cuts, trademarks, 
and registered diamonds allowing for differentiation. 
After 9/11, sensitivity to the financing of terror and money laundering worldwide rose to 
unprecedented levels. The U.S. Patriot Act, intended to prevent money laundering for the purpose of 
financing terrorism (Berger and Herstein, 2015), had a direct impact on the diamond industry. 
Labelling the world diamond industry as vulnerable to money laundering and financing terrorism, the 
act imposed severe restrictions on buyers and sellers of diamonds, precious stones, gold, and silver. In 
the 1990s the U.S. government, led by the Departments of State and the Treasury, began exploring 
ways of restricting the trade in blood diamonds, diamonds that originated in conflict areas and were 
mined at an extreme cost to human life. These efforts culminated in the Kimberley Process, a 
comprehensive international program launched in 2002, aimed at eradicating the sale of such 
diamonds that made the industry and trade within it more transparent and open to scrutiny (Spar, 
2004).  
On the supply side, not even the steadiest of cartels have been wholly immune to change. Over 
the past decade, the diamond trade has faced the end of apartheid in South Africa, the fall of 
Communism in Russia, the opening of many new mines, the fight against terror and money 
laundering, and the emergence of a worldwide movement against so-called "blood" or "conflict" 
diamonds. All of these developments have changed the diamond industry and required the 
diamantaires to transform the nature of their work. While a diamond may be forever, as the De Beers 
advertising claims, the cartel itself has also adapted its role from being the custodian of the industry to 
acting purely as a key player, thereby dismantling the cartel network that controlled the industry for 
over two centuries. This change led to the seventh stage based on free competition and marketing 
strategies both on the supply and demand side. 
 
Where is the Diamond Industry Headed? 
 Management theory evolves continually with new ideas that come from the attempts to 
transform theory into practice. Appreciating its history is a fundamental step for identifying the 
problems and sources of such paradigms. Managers often pay no attention to the importance of 
understanding the management history since they are more disposed to pay attention to actions 
occurring in the present. To disregard the progress of management throughout history is to risk 
repeating the same mistakes. Firms working in competitive environments are continually trying 
new ideas in-order to manage an increasingly complex business environment. They now understand 
that keeping in touch with and developing new knowledge is key factor in assuring their survival. 
The evolution of management theory mirrors the changes in the economic and social environments. 
Competitive advantage will increasingly be more difficult to define, for it will be based on speed, 
innovation, service and customization as well as volume, scale and low cost. Established firms 
cannot exclusively compete with sustaining technologies, because new entrants typically invade 
their markets with disruptive technologies. 
 Many managerial theorists argue that firms and managerial models can be understood as 
planned mechanisms that use various strategies for adapting to environmental change in pursuit of 
their goals (Berger and Herstein, 2015). Adhering to past managerial models in the face of changing 
market environments and customer demands can destroy a company’s competitive advantage. We 
believe that some of the inconsistent and weak findings in previous research on managerial behaviour 
in the diamond industry may be due, in part, to the failure to consider the role of the environment and 
strategic choice on the firm’s managerial strategy. Heightened competition is changing the structure of 
many industries, and the diamond industry is no exception. De Beers led the industry for over a 
century, ensuring that its stakeholders, be they producers or buyers, were satisfied. Its role was to 
guarantee stability in the market. Its strategy was to maintain the illusion that diamonds were scarce. 
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Changes in the external environment have been so significant that recently De Beers decided to 
relinquish its role as the custodian of the industry. No cartel in history has been able to extend its 
influence as broadly or for as long as De Beers, making it the most successful and long-lasting 
cartel in the world (Spar, 2006). 
 Historically, the diamond industry has implemented a flexible and opportunistic culture 
under the protective umbrella of De Beers (Mostovicz et al., 2007). Product familiarity and 
membership in the diamond centres have been deemed more important than managerial 
competencies leading to a strong sense of cohesion, but also of complacency. This led to 
managerial neglect and a failure to build robust intellectual property, processes, management 
systems, which would justify a premium within the wider market. Over time, the relationship with 
the outside world has become more complex, demanding a wider managerial skillset. Two 
managerial models based on strong interpersonal trust characterize the family business networks 
that dominated the diamond industry for a long time. First, these managerial models developed 
reciprocity based trust in which a member of the community offers to help another for the greater 
good of the collective. Such behaviour is evident in stages one to three presented in this paper. The 
managerial models are based on moral obligations but also in the fact that the social standing of a 
person within the wider network does not depend on individual performance but rather on the 
family. With a further evolution of the industry, a second type of managerial models emerged, 
characterized by enforceable trust, meaning that the deviant actions of network members would be 
sanctioned by the members of the network, thereby enforcing the compliance of shared norms. 
Networked members put their trust not only in close family members but also in the whole 
community. As stage four illustrates, outsiders would not be in a position to benefit from these 
trust-based relationships. However, over time, these dense family managed networks that had been 
key to the early expansion of the business and industry became a liability (Berger and Herstein, 
2012). As stages five to seven demonstrate, to become more competitive, the firms had to look 
outside the network and adopt a more impersonal, standardized managerial models to doing 
business.  
 As trust declined in the industry, managers increasingly were unwilling to take risks. They 
demanded greater protection against the possibility of betrayal and increasingly insist on costly 
sanctioning mechanisms to defend their interests, thus feeding the cycle of mistrust. The rational based 
managerial models recognizes that declining trust in exchanges increases transaction costs because 
those involved must take actions to protect themselves and guard against the possibility of the 
opportunistic behaviour of others (Bernstein, 1992). The cost of such actions may - or may not - be 
offset by more efficient exchanges. How do we analyse and evaluate the role of trust? In many cases in 
economics, anonymous exchange is used as a starting point for analysing competition. However, in 
reality, one often takes into account social structures and social relationships when analysing 
competition. The global information environment may prompt a further restructuring because this 
change has lowered the barriers to entry, minimizing the role of trust in the diamond trade. This is a 
major transformation from one extreme, the socially embedded trust-based exchange, to another, that 
of impersonal ties. This change is illuminated by a quotation from one diamantaire we interviewed:  
 
“It is only natural that the younger generation should see things differently from their elders. A person 
with extensive experience may sometimes hesitate to try a new technique or novel approach because of 
the very experience ... our fathers grew up with their firms, and their management approaches were 
relevant for that time ... the younger generation has been trained in different frameworks, in secondary 
school and in the army, where we learned new approaches to business and management”. 
 
 Over the next decade the diamond industry will face a new wave of challenges – from 
synthetic diamonds, from small-scale producers and from possible turnarounds in consumer 
sentiment. Any one of the developments discussed in the paper could potentially destroy the history 
of stable high prices and the scarcity of polished diamonds, a point for further scrutiny. It will be 
interesting to examine the environment’s future effects on the industry and the illusion of scarcity. 
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Will consumers continue purchasing diamonds in light of the blood diamonds scare and fraudulent 
behaviour? Will the diamond industry, leaderless without De Beers at the helm, be able to retain the 
mystique around diamonds that De Beers developed? Will there be an oversupply of diamonds in 
the market, reducing their prices and giving customers the feeling that they are not getting value for 
their investment? Diamond prices cannot remain artificially high if consumer tastes or fashions 
change or if incomes suddenly decrease. The answers to these questions will determine the future 
of the industry. 
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17 
Age 20-29 9 
30-39 16 
40-49 46 
50+ 29 
Average 44.94 
Sex Male 94 
Female 6 
Education (Years) Up to 12 71 
13-15 24 
Over 15 5 
Average 12.39 
Family Firm  (Generations in 
the Diamond Business) 
0  51 
1 7 
2 36 
3 5 
4+ 1 
Time in Business (Years) 0-9 14 
10-19 25 
20-29 41 
30+ 20 
Average 21.15 
Table 1: Sample Characteristics (N=100) 
 
Group (Export in US$m) No. 
Sampled 
Size of 
Population 
% Coverage 
S 1 (50+) 7   8 88 
S 2 (20 - 50) 20  26 77 
S 3 (10 - 20) 20  41 49 
S 4 (4 - 10) 53  115 46 
Total 100 190 53 
Table 2: Distribution of the Study Sample and the Research Coverage 
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Figure 1: The CSO Diamond Value Chain 
